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Prologue

To some extent, this overview is based on the introduction to the Routledge volume *Japanese-German Relations, 1895-1945*, co-edited by the author (Spang & Wippich 2006). Since that text has been completed, an astonishing number of related works appeared. A glance at the reference section shows an extraordinary amount of research conducted in German in the first decade and a half of the 21st century.¹ This article takes into account the latest findings and offers a synopsis of recent publications in the field.

The establishment of official bilateral contacts

Diplomatic relations between Japan and Germany go back to January 1861 when the Prusso-Japanese Treaty was signed by Count Friedrich zu Eulenburg and representatives of the Tokugawa government in Edo (Dobson/Saaler 2011, Pantzer 2011/2013). Similar to earlier unequal treaties, which Japan had concluded with other Western nations, it remained in force until the end of the century (Auslin 2004). From the 1860s to the 1880s, Prussia as well as the newly founded German Empire (est. 1871) had little ambition in East Asia other than safeguarding its rather limited trade interests and upholding its prestige

as a Great Power (Saaler 2015). While chancellor Otto von Bismarck was busy bolstering Germany's new role within European affairs, the British Empire, and to a lesser extent the United States and France became the early role models for Japan's modernization. Therefore, the majority of the first generation foreign experts hired by the Meiji-government, the so-called *oyatoi gaikokujin*, were in fact British.²

It took a decade after the establishment of bilateral relations, before the first two German experts went to Tokyo to teach at the Tokyo Medical School (*Igakujō*). Even though Theodor Hoffmann and Leopold Müller (Scheer 2006) stayed in Japan only for a few years (1871-75), they strongly influenced the development of Japanese medicine by introducing a German style curriculum to the leading medical institution of the country (Takuma 2005a/b). For decades, anyone who wanted to study medicine in Japan had to learn German first because many classes were taught in that language. Along with their most famous successor Erwin (von) Bälz (in Japan 1876-1905) and various other German experts, Hoffmann and Müller helped to establish the high reputation that German academia enjoyed in Meiji-Japan. Well into the twentieth century, it was therefore common practice that most ambitious medical doctors along with a few promising geographers or capable lawyers spent at least one year at a German university (Hartmann 2005). Many of them played an important role within bilateral relations and got involved with some of the organizations of German-Japanese exchange that will be introduced later.³ A number of those who went to Germany to study medicine later became famous in unrelated areas like politics (Gotō Shinpei) or literature (Mori Ōgai)

(Ivanova 2014).

Links between German and Japanese modernization

Soon after the Meiji restoration of 1868, a Japanese mission visited the USA and Europe, led by Iwakura Tomomi. Amongst the foreign leaders that impressed the Japanese most was Chancellor Bismarck, whom they met twice in Berlin in March 1873 (Kume 2009). After their return later that year, the idea of making conservative Germany a model for Japan's drive to become a westernized nation was gaining ground. During the 1870s and 80s, the Japanese army modernized itself in Prusso-German fashion. One important step in this direction was the establishment of a German-style general staff in 1878, initiated by Katsura Tarō (Lone 2000: 9-11), who had been studying the institutions of the Prussian army for many years. Following this, a new War College (*Rikugun Daigakkō*) was created, where various German military instructors taught the new military elite. The most famous of these was Klemens W. J. Meckel, teaching there from 1885 to 1888 (Eschke 2011/2013, Kerst 1970).

Furthermore, the authoritarian German constitution was the focus of intense scrutiny. Itō Hirobumi, one of the most influential *genrō* (elder statesmen) of the late Meiji and early Taishō period was amongst those who went to Berlin and Vienna to enquire about its suitability as a model for Japan (Takii 2014). During the late 1880s, the new Japanese constitution was drafted with the help of German legal advisors in Tokyo (Takii 2007). The most prolific legal scholars involved were Hermann Roesler (1834-1894) and Albert Mosse (1846-1925). As

Roesler was active in Japan for fifteen years (1878-93), working on the constitution was only part of his well-documented engagement as *oyatoi gaikokujin* (Bartels-Ishikawa 2007). In contrast, the Jewish judge Mosse was explicitly hired for this endeavor.⁴ One important structural parallel between both constitutions was the fact that both emperors were described as supreme leaders in wartime. Based on this, top representatives of the armed forces (mostly ministers and chiefs of staff) had direct access to the Kaiser as well as to the Tennō (*Immediatrecht*). Thus, political checks and balances of the military were very weak in the German as well as in the Japanese Empire (Schenck 1997: 203-204).

Besides legal questions, medicine and the military, further experts from Germany were employed in such diverse fields as court ceremonials (Ottmar von Mohl, in Japan 1887-89), ceramics (Gottfried Wagener, 1868-92), geography/geology (Edmund Naumann, 1875-80), meteorology (Erwin Knipping, 1871-91), mining (Curt A. Netto, 1873-86), musical education (Franz Eckert, 1879-99) and police (Wilhelm Höhn, 1885-91).⁵ Recently, Eckert (Gottschewski & Lee 2013a/b), Knipping (Koch & Puster 2014) as well as Wagener (Ueda 2007), have been intensively studied, as has the case of Johann J. Rein, who was sent to Japan in 1874 by the Prussian government to study Japanese crafts, industry, and trading (Koch & Conrad 2006).

Most of these men got involved with the German East Asiatic Society (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*, OAG), established only five years after the Meiji restoration (Spang, Saaler & Wippich 2015). From 1885 onwards, a number of influential Japanese joined the society as well (Spang 2006b, 2013b). Most prominent among

them was the above-mentioned Katsura, who after his military career became Prime Minister three times between 1901 and 1913. Another powerful Japanese member was Aoki Shūzō, who spent most of the last three decades of the 19th century either as Japan's representative in Berlin or as foreign minister in Tokyo. He spoke fluent German and had a German wife (Salm-Reifferscheidt 2011, Spang 2013b).

As an expression of a growing intimacy between Japanese and German academia, some of the most prolific pro-German Japanese scholars and politicians – among them Aoki and Katsura – established the German Studies Society (*Doitsu Gaku Kyōkai*) eight years after the foundation of the OAG. In some respect, the two societies were complementary: While the (mostly) German OAG studied Japan and East Asia, the Japanese society focused on Germany. In 1883, the Japanese opened their own school (*Doitsu Gaku Kyōkai Gakkō*) offering German language and legal studies classes.⁶ After these developments in Tokyo, a German-Japanese Society (*Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft*) was initiated in 1888 in Berlin (Haasch 1996). Its counterpart, the first Japanese-German Society (*Japanisch-Deutscher Verein – Nichi-Doku Kyōkai*) was established with great fanfare in 1911 but did not survive World War I.⁷ All these institutions offered ample opportunities for Germans and Japanese to meet and discuss academic and political matters. Many of the early presidents of the OAG like Rudolf Lehmann (in Japan 1869-1913) (Hoffmann 2006), Theodor von Holleben (1874/75, 1885-91) (Wippich 2012) or Karl Florenz (1889-1914) (Wachutka 2001) were very well connected. Particularly people like Lehmann and Florenz, who both spoke fluent Japanese were important bridge-builders between

the two nations.

The Triple Intervention 1895

Japan's victory over China in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894/95) proved that the country had learned from the West very fast. While Germany like all other Great Powers remained officially neutral, public opinion in German-speaking countries favored Japan (Wippich 2006). After the war, Russia feared destabilization in East Asia because China had agreed to transfer the Liaodong peninsula including the strategically important harbor of Port Arthur to Japan. Following this, St. Petersburg along with Paris and Berlin launched a diplomatic protest against the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty. France joined the so-called Triple Intervention based on the Franco-Russian Alliance (1894) and Germany supported this move because, the government hoped, joint action could provide a starting point to improve relations with the other two Great Powers. A potential rapprochement with Russia (and France) seemed far more significant than maintaining amicable contacts with Tokyo. As a result, Japan had to give up its plan to get a foothold on the Chinese coast, at least for the time being.

German participation in the Triple Intervention had been a severe shock to many Japanese because they had looked to the country as their role model for modernization. To make matters worse, Wilhelm II intended to strengthen German-Russian co-operation by trying to convince his cousin, Tsar Nicholas II, of Russia's civilising mission: to protect Europe against rising Japan, which he interpreted as "yellow peril" (Ikura 2006). Yet, this was only an indication of further difficulties

ahead. In a parliamentary speech delivered in December 1897, Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow argued, that from now on, Germany would “*demand a place in the sun.*” (“*Wir verlangen auch unseren Platz an der Sonne.*”)⁸ This speech has widely been interpreted as the first statement of the new German “*Weltpolitik*” (*world policy*). What Bülow meant, had been shown a month earlier by the German seizure of Qingdao. By doing so, Germany had gained a foothold on the Chinese coast, which was exactly what the Triple Intervention had prevented the Japanese from doing in spring 1895. Germany’s move triggered a race for concessions in China and thus threatened Japan’s aspirations there. The Russian takeover of Port Arthur in 1898 in particular led to serious diplomatic predicaments between Tokyo and St. Petersburg.

As a matter of fact, the cornerstone of late 19th century German Imperialism lay in sub-Sahara Africa, where the country gained various large territories since the mid-1880s. More relevant for German-Japanese relations were Germany’s lesser-known colonial acquisitions in Southeast Asia / Micronesia, which began around the same time.⁹ Already in 1878, a German flag was raised on Samoa, marking the beginning of the country’s involvement on the islands along with Britain and the USA. In late 1884, Germany began to claim some of the islands north of Papua New Guinea, the so-called Bismarck Archipelago. Half a year later, the Northeastern part of New Guinea became a German protectorate, run for some time by the German New Guinea Company. In 1886, the Marshall Islands were added in similar fashion. In 1888, Germany secured control of the Nauru Islands and, in 1899, the former Spanish Mariana, as well as the Caroline Islands and Palau were added

as a result of the German-Spanish Treaty of 30 June. In the same year, the Samoa Treaty (14 November 1899) solved the complicated situation there. The archipelago was divided into a smaller American-controlled (eastern) part and a bigger German-controlled (western) part (Stephenson 2009).

The Russo-Japanese War

Tokyo's active role in suppressing the so-called Boxer Rebellion in China, which had escalated after the murder of German diplomat Clemens von Ketteler, helped to smooth bilateral relations between Germany and Japan to some extent, but Russia's later reluctance to withdraw its troops from China increased diplomatic tensions. While London concluded the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 with Tokyo, Russia was reluctant to negotiate with Japan about the establishment of certain spheres of influence in East Asia. Strengthened by its earlier victory over China and the newly won alliance with the British Empire, Tokyo broke off relations with St. Petersburg and started hostilities with a surprise attack on Port Arthur in February 1904.

Again, all Great Powers remained neutral. Nevertheless, Wilhelm II renewed his propagation of the "yellow peril" idea (Iikura 2006), indicating a pro-Russian stance among part of the Prusso-German elite. Yet, based on anti-Russian sentiment, much of the German-speaking public favored the Japanese "David" against the Russian "Goliath" (Mottini 2014). Many political and military leaders in Europe and beyond secretly hoped for a war of attrition that would exhaust the involved parties, thus weakening their military capacity for the years

to come (Steinberg 2005). The war, in fact, strained the finances of both combatants, but Japan's victory increased the country's international status considerably.

With hindsight, the post-Bismarck years demonstrated that Germany's aggressive "*Weltpolitik*" had not improved the country's diplomatic situation. On the contrary, it had played an important role in the conclusion of various alliances of other Great Powers. In spring 1904, only a few weeks into the Far Eastern conflict, Great Britain and France settled their colonial disputes in the *Entente Cordiale*. When in 1907, London and St. Petersburg also reconciled their rivalries abroad, the idea of being surrounded by enemies, the so-called "*Einkreisungstheorie*" (encirclement theory) finally gained momentum in Germany.

Japan, in fact, was perceived differently in Germany after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the country's victory over Russia. While for decades, German officers had gone to Japan as military advisors or instructors, now, the number of military *observers* grew markedly. A case in point is the fact that Captain/Major Karl E. Haushofer was the first military officer to be sent to Japan by the semi-independent Royal Bavarian Army (1909/10). As German troops lacked any serious fighting experience since the Franco-German War 1870/71, Haushofer's job was to investigate how the Japanese managed to beat the Russians (Spang 2006a, 2013a). Other little known examples of the beginning of a real exchange between German and Japanese soldiers are various dictionaries of military terminology published by Shiba Kyōtarō and Takata Senjirō in 1909 as well as a set of two dictionaries by Hyōdō Saburō in 1909 and 1912 respectively. While

Hyōdō's 1909 German-Japanese dictionary was in accordance with the long-established attention paid by the Japanese army to German theory and strategy, the 1912 Japanese-German dictionary along with the similar one by Shiba and Takata published in 1909 indicated a newly developed reciprocal German interest.¹⁰ In the introduction to Hyōdō's 1912 dictionary, the editor explicitly mentions that it had been Japan's victory over Russia that spurred German inquisitiveness.¹¹

The Siege of Qingdao and German Prisoners of War in Japan

When, in the summer of 1914, war broke out between the European Great Powers, Japan joined the Western allies for two reasons. First, Tokyo did not want to risk its alliance with London. Second, entering the war potentially offered a good chance to finally gain a foothold on the Chinese coast. On 15 August 1914 the Japanese issued an ultimatum for Germany to hand over Qingdao. The fact that the language of the document resembled the note that the German envoy had presented in 1895 as part of the Triple Intervention was no coincidence. It showed how deeply the Japanese had been hurt by this. After the expiration of the ultimatum, Japan declared war on Germany, besieged the leasehold and finally occupied Qingdao in early November 1914. As a consequence, about 4,700 men became prisoners of war and spent the following years in Japanese camps (Krebs 2011b/2013).

While the fall of Qingdao had infuriated the German public in 1914, four years later this loss was little more than a distant unpleasant memory, which had not even stopped Berlin from approaching Tokyo a few times during the war in an unsuccessful attempt to gain a separate

peace and thus split the unity of the allies (Hayashima 1982). The sympathetic treatment most prisoners received in Japan during the war rapidly reconciled German public opinion thereafter.¹²

Germany and Japan after World War I

Within one generation since the Triple Intervention of 1895, the international status of Germany and Japan had dramatically changed in favor of the latter. Instead of gaining a “place in the sun”, Germany was now little more than a regional player. While the “*Novemberrevolution*” at the end of World War I had overthrown the imperial system, it neither made republicans out of most Germans, nor did it remove the old elites from their established positions. Paragraph 231 of the Versailles Treaty blamed Berlin alone for the outbreak of war, a view that the majority of contemporary Germans did not accept, and which has been debated recently again (Clark 2012). The high war-indemnities Germany was asked to pay, were legally justified by § 231, but were in reality based on the fact that most of the military action had taken place beyond German borders. Along with all its colonies or leaseholds abroad, the former Empire lost some of its territory to Poland, France, Denmark, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. Danzig became a “Free City” with close links to Poland and the Territory of the Saar Basin (*Saargebiet*) as well as the Memel Territory (*Memelland*) a mandate of the League of Nations. While the latter returned to Germany after a plebiscite in 1935, the Memel Territory (or *Klaipėdos kraštas*) was occupied by Lithuania in 1923 (Boemeke, Feldman & Glaser 1998, Haffner & Bateson 1988).

Right after the end of the war, military circles invented the

“stab-in-the-back” legend (*Dolchstoßlegende*), according to which the war was not lost by the armed forces fighting the enemy but because the “leftist” home front had not supported their effort adequately. Those on the right of the political spectrum reacted by rejecting not only the controversial Versailles Treaty but the new democratic system in general. The misleading *Dolchstoßlegende* became the battle cry of the ultranationalists against the political left (Barth 2003, Diest & Feuchtwanger 1996). The resulting turmoil, which involved various coup d'états and numerous strikes as well as hyperinflation lasted until a new currency, the so-called *Rentenmark*, stabilized the country in late 1923.¹³

In international relations, the immediate postwar years, were not particularly successful for Japan either. This was due to the results of the peace conference in Paris (1919/20) and the subsequent Washington conference (1921/22). The rejection of Tokyo's request to include a clause on racial equality in the covenant of the League of Nations (1919), the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1922), the forced withdrawal from Qingdao (1922)¹⁴ along with the introduction of restrictive immigration laws in the USA (1924) led to diplomatic frictions between Japan and its former allies. These changes in the international situation helped to recreate a positive atmosphere between Japan and Germany. The Berlin government was eager to improve relations with Tokyo because Japan was an influential player in the League of Nations, which in turn was important for the Weimar Republic's desire to re-negotiate the imposed war indemnities.

In the 1920s, bilateral military relations were among the first to

be restored. One reason was Japanese interest in Erich Ludendorff's concept of "total war" (Ludendorff 1935). Many Japanese army officers feared that Japan might end up in a similar position in the future, being forced to mobilize the whole nation to have any chance in a possible war against an otherwise superior alliance of opponents (Saaler 2006). To do so, Japan needed to modernize its weaponry first. Due to the accelerated development of military technology during World War I, the country's military hardware, which had been good enough to beat Russia in 1904/05 was fairly outdated after World War I. In this respect, the otherwise powerless Weimar Republic had to offer what Japan's armed forces were looking for, namely, war-tested cutting-edge technology. Furthermore, the *Reichswehr* and the *Reichsmarine* were willing to cooperate with other armed forces to further develop this know-how.¹⁵ As Japan's interest grew, a network of semi-official and often secret contacts developed, linking German military experts and arms brokers with Japanese army and navy officers as well as manufacturers. Many of these activities were illegal under the terms of the Versailles Treaty (Krug et al. 2001, Sander-Nagashima 2006).

German soft power

The politically and economically weak Weimar Republic remained one of the world leaders in terms of high culture and innovative research. As many members of the Japanese elite could read German and had not forgotten Germany's former role as an important model for Meiji-Japan's modernization, German influence continued to some extent. The number of aspiring Japanese scholars going to

Germany rather increased during the 1920s (Seifert 2013). Based on this, a growing affection for “Waimaru bunka” (Weimar culture) developed during the *Taishō Democracy* era in Japan. Many of those Japanese who had spent some time in Weimar Germany later played a role in Japan’s democratization after 1945 (Katō 2006).

Even though East Asia did not feature very high on Germany’s postwar agenda, the Foreign Office in Berlin considered culture policy abroad as the best possible way to re-establish ties with Tokyo. In the early 1920s, German Nobel laureates Albert Einstein (1922) and Fritz Haber (1924) went to Japan for some lectures. Their visits helped to raise Japanese funds to support research institutions in Germany. The most important sponsor was Hoshi Hajime, who had made a fortune with his pharmaceutical company. Hoshi transferred millions of Reichsmark to so-called “*Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft*”, the predecessor of today’s German Research Foundation (DFG) (Hanai 2005). Overall, the use of culture as a means to improve German-Japanese relations faced some limitations due to the fact that German interest in Japan was rather limited and did often not go beyond exoticism (Schepers 2006). Furthermore, there were very few Germans, who understood Japanese.¹⁶ Until 1945, their number never went beyond a few dozen.¹⁷

Despite the fact that he spoke little Japanese, the first representative of the Weimar Republic to Japan was well suited for the new focus on culture policy. Dr. Wilhelm Solf had studied South Asian languages before joining the German colonial service, a career path that led him to become Colonial (1911-18) and Foreign Secretary (1918) (Käser 2012, Vietsch 1961). Among the most important developments

that he supported was the foundation of two culture institutes in Berlin and Tokyo in 1926 and 1927 respectively. Both were co-sponsored by the two governments and jointly headed by a German and a Japanese scholar (Bieber 2008, Frieze 1980, Hack 1995). Also in 1926, the Japanese-German Society was revived and a few years later, a third institute was established in Kyoto, focusing on German culture.

Some of the directors of these institutes turned out to be influential figures within the context of bilateral relations. Kanokogi Kazunobu was one of the most prominent Japanese ultranationalists from the 1920s to the early 40s (Katō 2006, Szpilman 2013). During his time as Japanese head of the *Japaninstitut* in Berlin (1926-29), he re-established the German-Japanese Society (DJG). Later, he had close contacts with various members of the Japanese oligarchy as well as with the German embassy in Tokyo. Friedrich M. Trautz (Berlin/Kyoto), Wilhelm Gundert (Tokyo) and Walter Donat (Tokyo) stand out among the Germans involved with the three institutes. Trautz had the original idea of establishing the *Japaninstitut* in Berlin and became the founding director in Berlin (1926-30/32) as well as in Kyoto (1934-38). Gundert was his counterpart in Tokyo (1927-36) before being appointed to the chair of Japanese Studies at Hamburg University in 1936. He was an outspoken supporter of National Socialism but not as fanatic as Walter Donat, his successor at the institute (1936/38-41), who was also the head of the National Socialist Teachers League's (NSLB) Japan section for many years (1934-41) (Spang 2011: 76-78). Donat was thus one of the most prominent representatives of National Socialism in Tokyo, which was barely existing in spring 1933 but managed to control nearly all

aspects of German life in Japan only a few years later (Nakamura 2009).

During their time in Tokyo, Gundert as well as Donat got involved with the OAG, which accepted the new circumstances without any serious effort to defend its independence. Because party members from 1934 onwards controlled the streamlined society, OAG-events and publications provided some kind of academic reputation for the Nazi party in the Japanese capital. One aspect of the streamlining or “*Gleichschaltung*” of the OAG and most Germans in Japan was the expulsion of Nazi-critics and Jews from all German institutions (Spang 2011: 77-86). Even though this took longer than the Nazis would have hoped for (partly due to the lackluster cooperation by their Japanese allies, who never fully understood the Nazi interpretation of the “Jewish question”), by 1939/40 most of those who were considered Jewish by the Nazis had not only lost their jobs but were avoided by their former friends and acquaintances as Heinz Altschul, a German businessman in Kobe, impressively describes in his recollections (Herwig, Pekar & Spang 2014: 40-41 & 60-65, Spang 2014: 25-26).

The end of democracy

The political changes that occurred in Japan and Germany in the 1930s can be attributed to a number of domestic as well as external causes. The repercussions of the New York stock market crash of 29 October 1929, i.e. the subsequent “Great Depression”, was undoubtedly among the most important factors. In the following years, the volume of international trade was halved. Unemployment rose to unprecedented levels, strengthening political fringes and undermining weak democratic

structures in Germany and Japan alike. The dwindling demand as well as the sharp drop in the price for raw silk and silk products, increased the poverty level of Japanese peasants, particularly in the North-Eastern regions of the main island (Martin 2006: 106-139). As the army's officer corps had its roots in the peasantry, these developments meant that the more radical among them turned to extreme actions such as the numerous political assassinations and attempted *coup d'états* between 1930 and 1936.¹⁸

Under these circumstances, the government in Tokyo was no longer able to effectively control the military. In fact, the cabinet was held hostage by the armed forces because the army as well as the navy minister had to be active officers (Schenck 1997: 203). Army and navy headquarters thus had the power to topple governments by not allowing any officer to join the cabinet. Politicians had to accept the military's predominance, leading to totalitarian tendencies in government structure. To make matters worse, the "Manchurian Incident", i.e. the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 by local Japanese forces, the so-called Kwantung Army, and the subsequent foundation of the puppet state Manchukuo in 1932, proved that the army leadership itself was not able to restrain the troops either, meaning that the (often radical) middle-ranked officers had become disproportionately influential.

As a reaction to developments in Manchuria, the League of Nations sent an international fact-finding mission to East Asia to inquire about the origins of the conflict. Among its five members was Dr. Heinrich Schnee, a former governor of German East Africa. When the so-called Lytton Report was published, it was comparatively

conciliatory but still made it clear that the action of the Japanese army could not be seen as an act of self-defense and that the establishment of the new state was not in accordance with international law. In February 1933, a motion was raised in the League's General Assembly, which declared Japan to be the aggressor. One month later, Tokyo officially declared its withdrawal from the League (Burkmann 2008). This step seriously weakened the interwar international system and effectively isolated Japan. At about the same time, Hitler's seizure of power in 1933 abruptly ended the Weimar Republic, which had been a model for Japan's *Taishō Democracy*.

Japan in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*

In the early 1930s, Germany was economically and militarily rather weak and therefore not attractive as a potential ally (for Japan). Despite aggressively introducing a planned economy with the aim of self-sufficiency, it took the Nazi regime a few years to overcome this situation by investing in military and civil infrastructure at unsustainable rates. During this phase, Nazi racism was an important reason for Japan's initial restraint. If one looks at how the Nazis used anti-Semitism as well as the propaganda of an Aryan "master-race" to integrate the German nation with slogans like "*Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer*" (one people, one nation, one leader) or "*Blut und Boden*" (blood and soil), there can be no doubt that the concept of "race" was an important ideological pillar of the Nazi system.

A key text to understand basic National-Socialist ideology is undoubtedly *Mein Kampf*. In this book, Hitler deals with Japan a few

times. The most relevant reference can be found in the chapter “Nation and Race”. There, Hitler refers to a three-fold division of races in the following way: *“If we were to divide mankind into three groups, the founders of culture, the bearers of culture and the destroyers of culture, only the Aryan could be considered as the representative of the first group.”* As the sole example for culture-bearing races, Hitler refers to the Japanese: *“If beginning today all further Aryan influence on Japan would stop [...] the present culture would freeze and sink back into the slumber from which it was awakened seven decades ago by the wave of Aryan culture.”*¹⁹

In 1933, when Hitler became German chancellor, the Japanese thus found themselves semiofficially sandwiched between the Aryans and the Jews, a position, which was obviously not acceptable for a country where the national policy (*kokutai*), declared that Japan was the “land of the gods”.²⁰ Complaints by Japanese and other diplomats played some role regarding the introduction of the new racial laws announced at the NSDAP party convention in Nuremberg in 1935.²¹ From then on, races were divided into a) Germans and people of “kindred blood” and b) the Jews. In this way, all others became “honorary Aryans”, which solved some of the diplomatic problems – at least on the surface. Still, many Nazis saw the Aryans as somehow “better” than others and hardliners continued to see racial purity as a number one priority not at least vis-à-vis the Japanese.²²

Other than in Hitler’s race-system, Japan appears in *Mein Kampf* in connection with the Russo-Japanese War²³ and again when Hitler deliberates on the alleged “Jewish world conspiracy”. In Hitler’s eerie discussion of the so-called “Jewish question” towards the end of chapter

13, he wrote the following: *“The annihilation of Germany was not an English interest but primarily a Jewish one, just as today a destruction of Japan serves British state interests less than it does the widespread desires of the leaders of the projected Jewish world empire. [...] Now the Jew knows only too well that [...] he may have been able to undermine European peoples and train them to be raceless bastards, but that he would scarcely be in a position to subject an Asiatic national state like Japan to this fate. [...] he lacks the bridges to the yellow Asiatic. [...] In his millennial Jewish empire he dreads a Japanese national state, and, therefore, desires its annihilation even before establishing his own dictatorship.”*²⁴

After all this arguing about how the Jews are supposedly trying to establish a world-wide empire and making a very strong case for Japan as one of the few potential bulwarks against this development, one might expect an uncompromising call for close anti-Jewish cooperation with Japan; particularly because all of this is discussed towards the end of the “German Alliance Policy after the War” chapter. Yet, Hitler mentions nothing along these lines, indicating that he most likely saw the later alliance with Japan as a racially questionable, temporary tool to gain German domination over Europe.²⁵ In this respect, there are striking similarities between Hitler and the long-time president of the Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verein*), Heinrich Claß. Two years before the outbreak of World War I, Claß had called for domestic as well as foreign policy to be conducted along racial lines. According to Claß, it would contradict German racial conscience to cooperate with Japan in a joint attack on Russia, even though he considered the Russians as the lowest of the white races and the Japanese as the

highest of the colored races (Claß 1912: 176-177).²⁶

Bilateral rapprochement

After the foundation of Manchukuo (1932), the withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933) and the failure to reach an improved naval agreement with the British Empire and the United States (1935-36), Japan's diplomatic isolation had become obvious. To get out of this self-imposed deadlock, the country had to side either with the developing Fascist camp in continental Europe or to accept (some of) the demands by the Western powers. The latter policy would have meant making concessions in China, a move only a small minority of liberal-minded politicians within the Tokyo oligarchy would have been prepared to accept. In general, the army as well as many of the more nationalistic politicians favored co-operation with Germany (and Italy), while some navy representatives, liberal politicians and the people surrounding the court tried to come up with ways to appease Japan's former allies. This internal power struggle made it very difficult for any Japanese government to pursue a consistent diplomacy towards either side (Krebs 1991: 51).²⁷

In the mid-1930s, the Third Reich faced similar questions. Overall, the Nazi interest in Japan was mostly propagandistic and partly strategic; the Far Eastern empire was conceived as a potential partner against communism. Within the contemporary mindset, the comparatively small territories of Germany and Japan combined with significant population pressure called for geopolitical readjustments, i.e. more living space (*Lebensraum*). Based on this understanding of world

affairs, leaders in Berlin and Tokyo were challenging the international status quo.

In March 1935, universal conscription was re-introduced in Germany, an open breach of the Versailles Treaty. One year later, Hitler abrogated the Locarno Treaty, in which the Weimar Republic had acknowledged its Western borders in 1925. Simultaneously the new *Wehrmacht* entered the de-militarized zone along Germany's western borders. By then, it became apparent that the Nazi regime no longer accepted any diplomatic limitations of its power but was rather trying to impose a new order in Europe. While these developments seem to have nothing to do with German-Japanese relations, in fact, they constituted indispensable prerequisites to any bilateral rapprochement beyond culture and science. Only after Germany freed itself from all restraints, did an alliance with Berlin become a genuine option for Tokyo.

In Germany, industrial and military leaders as well as the Foreign Ministry under Konstantin von Neurath (1932-38) continued to favor China, mostly for economic reasons. During the 1920s and 1930s, Sino-German relations had prospered in various areas. In fact, a semi-official group of German advisors counselled Chiang Kai-shek on military matters for over a decade (Martin 1981). Yet, after the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" in July 1937 developed into the second Sino-Japanese War, the Third Reich like all other countries had to choose between China and Japan (Martin 2006: 189-207). Half a year after the outbreak of hostilities in China, the German Foreign Ministry as well as the *Wehrmacht* (Blomberg-Fritsch crisis), which had so far barely

been touched by the Nazis, were finally subjugated by reshuffling the respective leadership. Hitler's foreign policy adviser, Joachim von Ribbentrop, became Foreign Minister in February 1938 and Wilhelm Keitel took over the newly created Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, OKW).²⁸ After that, the military advisors and the ambassador were withdrawn from China (Martin 1981).

In theory, Hitler's favorite ally had always been Britain but London was not prepared to accept Nazi domination in continental Europe. The ultimate failure of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935-1939) made this clear.²⁹ For Hitler, Japan's major attraction was its geopolitical location at the opposite end of the Soviet-controlled Eurasian landmass. Tokyo could serve as a diplomatic substitute for London because Germany and Japan faced similar problems. Long before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Nazis had asked Japan to open hostilities against Singapore, which would have had repercussions on the availability and strength of British forces in Europe.³⁰ Yet, even after the assault on the Soviet Union, Hitler hoped to win this self-proclaimed "racial battle" without the direct support of his "colored" ally until the defeat at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43 ended all realistic hopes of beating the USSR alone.

In Ribbentrop's alternative concept of power politics, Japan had been given the role of a counter-weight to Britain and possibly an integral part of a "transcontinental block" stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, an idea that Karl E. Haushofer had been propagating since publishing *Dai Nihon* in 1913 (Spang 2006a, 2013a). This way

of thinking was particularly influential between 1939 and 1941. The *Wehrmacht* leaders again, were not overly interested in an alliance with Japan. This was largely due to the geographical distance, which made any direct co-operation nearly impossible; a point of view that proved largely correct during the years of parallel rather than joint warfare of the Axis powers.

All this shows clearly that political aims, racist ideas and wishful thinking were often closely intertwined in bilateral relations between Germany and Japan. The distorted understanding of the *bushidō* (samurai spirit) is a case in point. Obviously, stories like the famous 18th century tale of the 47 ronin, showcasing an extreme incidence of samurai loyalty impressed the Nazis and their supporters (Maltarich 2005). This can be shown by looking at the conclusion of a short article series published by Heinz Corazza in the SS journal *Das Schwarze Korps*. These texts were finally put together and published as a small offprint, with a brief foreword by Heinrich Himmler (Corazza 1937): “*There is no samurai order any more. But its unwritten laws are today the iron base of the empire of the rising sun, despite all the paragraphs that are the unavoidable byproducts of a modern state. For the Japanese as well, the written laws are enough in peaceful times, but in stormy times, the eternal virtues are the only final guideline.*”³¹ It becomes obvious here that Corazza, and with him many SS-members and other Nazis, wrongly interpreted the samurai code of honor as an intrinsic characteristic of all Japanese (Orbach 2008).

The hollow alliance³²

After the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 and the Italian accession to it one year later, relations between Berlin and Tokyo became closer. In November 1938, a cultural agreement was signed (Haasch 1996: 330) and around the same time there were lengthy discussions about a military treaty, which was never realized, partly because the Japanese oligarchy was divided into a pro-Axis and a pro-Western group. Instead, the Nazi regime – in a move that left many onlookers perplexed – went on to conclude the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, often referred to as the “Hitler-Stalin Pact” in August 1939. The Japanese, who at that time were involved in serious skirmishes with the Red Army near Nomonhan at the border between Mongolia and Manchuria suffering heavy losses in men and material, saw the Third Reich’s co-operation with Stalin as an outright betrayal of the anti-communist basis of German-Japanese cooperation. Astounded by developments in Europe as well as in Manchuria, Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirō resigned within one week after the Non-Aggression Treaty had been concluded in Moscow.

Instead of looking to Berlin (and Rome) for some way out of its isolation, Tokyo tried again to restore its relations with Washington and London. But without being prepared to offer any conceivable concessions (in China), these talks did not lead anywhere. On the contrary, the development of the war in Europe made the Japanese quickly re-evaluate their relations with Germany. After the *Wehrmacht*

occupied the Netherlands and the northern part of France in early summer 1940, Dutch as well as French colonies in East Asia lost the protection of their “motherlands”. The colonial administration of Dutch East India (today’s Indonesia) reacted by first interning German men but soon interned also women and children, although the latter group were subsequently allowed to leave the colony. Most of them went to Shanghai or Kobe. As their planned return to Germany was rendered impossible due to the outbreak of hostilities between the Third Reich and the USSR, many of the refugees from Dutch East India ended up living in Kobe, meaning that the German community there grew considerably in early 1941 (Lehmann 2007, 2009). The interned German men were transferred to British India in early 1942. One of the three ships transporting these internees was tragically sunk by a Japanese plane, unaware that the *Van Imhoff* had about 480 Germans on board.³³

Long before this happened, Japan, Germany and Italy had concluded the Tripartite Pact in September 1940. After short negotiations in Tokyo, this pact had been signed in Berlin, dividing zones of influence in Europe, Northern Africa and Asia between the three signatories to avoid any potential friction between them. This approach is a good example for the basic idea underlying German-Japanese relations in the Nazi era. Japan as well as Germany needed the other country to avoid isolation but were not prepared to compromise on their own drive for expansion.³⁴

While Germany was secretly preparing the assault on the USSR, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke went on his much-publicized European tour and concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet

Union on his way back from Berlin and Rome in April 1941. By doing so, the Imperial government hoped to guard the rear for Japan's intended southward advance. Only ten weeks later, the *Wehrmacht* attacked the USSR. After all these twists, the Anti-Comintern Pact was revived on 25 November 1941 when delegates from six countries signed a five-year extension in Tokyo.³⁵

On the Axis side, barely any practical military cooperation was arranged, let alone a common strategy implemented. Thus, German/Italian warfare remained largely separate from the Japanese one. This was partly because of the sheer distance between Europe and Japan,³⁶ and partly due to the fact that the primary adversary in each theatre of war was different. While the *Wehrmacht* was mainly fighting the Red Army for living space in Eastern Europe (*Lebensraum im Osten*), Japan was trying to establish the so-called Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (*Daitōa Kyōeiken*). To implement this policy, Japan was engaged in a war of attrition in China as well as fighting against American and Commonwealth troops in the Pacific region.

To justify expansionist campaigns, many German and Japanese politicians as well as journalists and scholars referred to a suspected antagonism between “have” and “have-not” nations. On this basis, they demanded a territorial “new order”, a supposedly fair share of the globe for all nations in accordance with their population and their economic and other capabilities. In both countries, pseudo-academic geopolitical terms such as living space (*Lebensraum* and *seikatsu-kūkan* respectively) were widely used in support of these arguments (Spang 2006a, 2013a).

Conclusion

There are undoubtedly some remarkable parallels between Japanese and German history in the modern age. As both countries experienced some kind of unification around 1870, they were latecomers to the world stage (Kudō, Tajima, Pauer 2009). It was not until the late 19th century that Japan and Germany gained their first overseas territories, leading to conflicting interests and the Japanese takeover of Qingdao in 1914. After World War I, relations between both countries were dominated by Japan's interest in German military technology and cultural exchanges. After governments in Tokyo and Berlin had isolated themselves from their neighboring countries in the early 1930s, they approached each other. Yet, even the decade following the Anticomintern Pact of 1936 saw serious vicissitudes within bilateral relations. In 1945, both countries suffered crushing defeats, culminating in their respective unconditional surrender. Nevertheless, the controversial postwar trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo showed that earlier allied claims for a coordinated Axis conspiracy for world rule were little more than wartime propaganda.

Later, the outbreak of the Cold War meant that the United States ended up pushing Japan as well as West-Germany to re-arm after the former Axis partners had been thoroughly demilitarized. With the support of American Marshall Plan funding, both economies regained their strength, and within a few decades, Japan and (West-) Germany became world powers again, this time (more or less) limited to the economic field.

- 1 The most recent books by Bieber (2014) and Kim (2014) came out only shortly before the deadline for this article and could therefore barely be taken into account. For comments about earlier publications on Japanese history and German-Japanese relations, refer to Spang & Wachtuka 2003, and Krebs 2009. For some more critical reviews of three recent works, see Krebs (2011a) and Spang (2007 & 2008). In 2015, two relevant volumes will be published, dealing with the history of the German East Society (OAG): Spang, Saaler & Wippich, and with German-Japanese relations from 1860 to 2000: Cho, Roberts & Spang.
- 2 According to Schmidhofer 2010: 511, there are various reports about the number of foreigners in Japan during the 1870s. Among around 1600 to 1700, roughly 50% were British, 15% American and about 10% French and German.
- 3 See Hoppner & Sekikawa 2005. Among 52 portraits of Germans and Japanese, who exercised some influence on bilateral relations before 1945, there are three German professors of medicine (Hoffmann, Müller, Scriba) and no less than eleven Japanese who had studied medicine – at least to some extent. Therefore, 27% of the people portrayed in the book had a medical background. Cf. Kim 2014.
- 4 The letters Mosse and his wife sent home during their four years in Japan (1886-1890) have been edited by Ishii, Lokowandt & Sakai (1995). This correspondence shows how Mosse saw contemporary Japan. Furthermore, his comments about other foreigners in Tokyo are enlightening, hinting at anti-Semitic sentiments within the local German community.
- 5 Martin 2006: 17-76, deals with the “Fatal Affinities” between Germany and Japan in more detail.
- 6 Dokkyō University traces its roots to this school. One of the early instructors (1885-89) was Georg Michaelis, who – like many of his successors – joined the OAG and published in the OAG-journal (MOAG). Later, he was German chancellor for a few months in 1917. See Becker, 2001, for further details.
- 7 The foundation and the events of the JDV were frequently mentioned in the reports by ambassador von Rex to his superiors in Berlin. See Political Archive of the German Foreign Office (PAAA), R 18621. On 1 Nov. 1911 for example Rex send the German version of the JDV statues, and on 18 June 1912, Rex reported on a JDV event, that was attended by Yamagata Aritomo and Katsura Tarō. Cf. Spang, Saaler & Wippich 2015.
- 8 The speech is reprinted in Bülow 1907: 6-8. The quote is to be found on page 8. The background to Bülow’s comment is the phrase “the Empire on which the

sun never sets”, which had been used in various forms for a variety of empires, most notably for the early Spanish empire and the late British Empire.

- 9 A case in point for the oversight of Germany’s involvement in Asian are two recent books on Wilhelmine imperialism (Baranowski 2011, Langbehn & Salama 2011), which barely mention Germany’s colonies there.
- 10 Lieutenant-General Tōjō Hidenori and Major-General Ōshima Kenichi provided forewords to the first of these dictionaries. Knowing that their sons, i.e. wartime premier Tōjō Hideki and Japanese military attaché and later ambassador to Germany, Ōshima Hiroshi, played important roles within Japanese militarism and relations between Japan and Germany, it becomes clear that the ideas of some Meiji officers strongly influenced the later wartime leaders.
- 11 Around the same time, from August to October 1912, Friedrich M. Trautz translated the new Japanese soldier handbook (“*Hohei Sōten*”) for the German general staff. See Federal Archive, Department Military Archive in Freiburg, Germany, N 508, Vol. 103. Saaler 2006: 26, mentions that the German general staff had already translated some other Japanese military documents as early as 1907.
- 12 A lot of research has been done about Germans in Japanese PoW camps. For an account in English, see Burdick & Moessner 1984. There is a virtual exhibition about the most famous (Bandō) camp accessible at <http://bando.dijtokyo.org> in German and Japanese (retrieved 5 Sept. 2014).
- 13 After the stabilization of the economic situation in Germany, the new *Reichsmark* was introduced in the summer of 1924. It did not replace the *Rentenmark* immediately though. In fact, the old bills and coins remained legal tender until 1948.
- 14 For an account of Qingdao’s history after the end of the German period, see Bauer 2000.
- 15 During the 1920s and early 1930s, the *Reichswehr* also cooperated with the Soviet Army. See Seidt 2002: 179-214.
- 16 While no Japanese would have dared to call himself a German Studies expert without an excellent command of the language, the already mentioned Karl E. Haushofer was a well-accepted authority on Japan despite the fact that he had only basic Japanese language skills. See Spang 2013a: 119-125.
- 17 Trautz wrote in an article (1928: 44) that there were about one dozen Germans able to read and write Japanese. Worm (1994: 159) estimated that this number had risen only slightly by the early 1940s. Until 1945, Japanese Studies programs

had been established only at the universities of Berlin in 1887, Hamburg in 1914 and Leipzig in 1932.

- 18 The title of a 70 year old book summarizes this state of affairs very well: H. Byas (1942) *Government by Assassination*. The book has been reprinted in 2007.
- 19 Hitler 1990: 263-264.
- 20 The Tennō was seen as a living god, a direct descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu.
- 21 On 11 and 30 Oct. 1933, Ambassador Nagai Matsuzō went to the Foreign Office to inquire about the standing of the Japanese within the Nazi race system. See *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik* (ADAP), C, II.1, Doc. 123. Cf. Hack 1996: 207-224.
- 22 The files of the German embassy in Tokyo clearly show, that local Nazi representatives vigorously opposed marriages between Japanese and Germans. See PAAA, RAV Deutsche Botschaft in Tokyo (1924-1945 (1946)), Vol. 5 and 6 (*"Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft"*). The first official representative of the Nazi Party in Japan, Fritz Scharf, was apparently trying to exclude Japanese spouses of Germans and half-Japanese from German institutions in Japan. Otto von Erdmannsdorff, counsellor at the German embassy in Tokyo, mentions this in a letter to the former German ambassador in Tokyo, Wilhelm Solf, from 20 July 1933 (Federal Archive Koblenz, N 1053, Vol. 92: 36-37). See Spang 2011: 78.
- 23 Hitler 1990: 145. Hitler favored Japan, but he did so mostly due to anti-Russian, or anti-Slavic racism.
- 24 Ibid.: 583-584.
- 25 In spring 1945, in the so-called "Bormann Diktaten" (published in 1981 under the misleading title *"Hitlers politisches Testament"*), Hitler stated on 13 Feb. 1945 that he never looked down on the Chinese or Japanese, which clearly contradicted what he had written two decades earlier in *Mein Kampf*. On 18 Feb. 1945, he lamented that Japan had not attacked Singapore in 1940 but also stated that Germany and Japan would either jointly win or go down together. How relevant these late comments are, remains an open question. See Spang 2013a: 385-393, for an account of Karl E. Haushofer's influence of Hitler's early view of Japan. Hübner 2009 argues similarly, Koltermann 2009 offers a divergent interpretation.
- 26 In a letter addressed to Claß, Hitler himself had told the addressee that he thought Claß' book contained everything Germans need to know (Kruck 1954: 192). See also Stoakes 1986: 44-45. For a very good overview over the

- background of racism in general, refer to Kowner and Demel 2012.
- 27 This development of internal affairs has been discussed by many authors in recent years, with some arguing in favor of applying the term “fascist” and others rejecting it. See Hippin 2004, Krämer 2005, and Schölz 2006. Krebs 2009: 125-128, concisely summarizes the related arguments.
 - 28 Both men were sentenced to death at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal and executed on 16 Oct. 1945.
 - 29 The agreement, which had been concluded in June 1935 was renounced in April 1939 by the Third Reich, a move that caused some disturbance in Japan, particularly within the Imperial Navy. See Hoyt 1990: 101.
 - 30 The correspondence between the German embassy and the Foreign Office in Berlin proves the government’s interest in a Japanese attack on Singapore. See ADAP, D, XI.2, No. 735 (31 Jan. 1941), *ibid.*, XII, No. 100 (27 Feb. 1941) and No. 209 (25 March 1941).
 - 31 English translation by the author. The full German text is available online. See <https://archive.org/details/Corazza-Heinz-Die-Samurai> (retrieved 11 Sept. 2014). The quote comprises the last lines of the text.
 - 32 This term is widely used to describe the reality of German-Japanese relations, particularly during the war years. It was coined by Menzel Meskill. It is remarkable that her 1966 book was reprinted in 2012. For a short overview of the wartime alliance, refer to Martin 2006: 140-161, and 265-285.
 - 33 The *Van Imhoff* incident caused some irritations between the Netherlands and West-Germany when it became clear that the Dutch crew saved themselves without offering any help to the Germans in their custody. The German journal *Der Spiegel* referred to this behavior as a war crime in two articles published 22 Dec. 1965: 42-44 (<http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46275481.html>) and 6 Feb. 1966: 42-44 (<http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46265597.html>) (both retrieved 3 March 2014).
 - 34 The triangular pact was celebrated by the propaganda journal *Berlin-Rom-Tokio* that the German Foreign Office published between 1939 and 1944.
 - 35 An account of this event can be found in the January 1942 issue of *Contemporary Japan* 11-1: 34.
 - 36 Between June 1941 and May 1945, the exchange of goods and personnel between Europe and Asia was very limited because of the American-British control over most of the open sea. Only very few blockade runners or submarines were able to reach either Japan or Germany. See Felton 2005 and Krug 2001 as well as, to

a lesser extent, Chapman 2011.

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和文概要

この論文は1861年1月24日にプロイセン王国と江戸幕府の間の「日普修好通商条約」という不平等条約から1930・40年代の同盟政策や第二次世界大戦までの日独関係について考察したものである。2006年、筆者はウィビッヒ先生と『Japanese-German Relations, 1895-1945. War, Diplomacy and Public Opinion』という論文集を共編しました。出版社は英語圏のアジア学や人文科学分野で有名なラウトレッジ (Routledge) 社でした。共著した総論は現代史における日独関係についての入門的な論文でした。2015年、筆者はJ. Cho氏とL. Roberts氏と共編の日独関係についての論文集を出版する予定です。その本のタイトルは『Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan』です。この本を準備するために、最近の日独関係史に関する資料や文献を調査し、10年前の共著の総論を補充し、アプローチをより広げました。今度の論文は概論だけではなくて、最新の日本とドイツの現代史における関係をテーマにした資料・論文・文献を紹介することにも努めました。

日独両国の陸軍や海軍の軍人、学者同士の関係は、第一次世界大戦期を除いて良好な関係にありました。本論「Japanese-German Relations Revisited」の特徴は、このような日独両国の良好な関係のみならず、1930・40年代の日独伊三国同盟の政策に言及すると共に、明治から第二次世界大戦までの日独両国の関係が決して良好な関係が続いていた訳ではなかったことも指摘しました。具体的には同時期の、仏独露三国干渉(1895年)、日独戦争(青島、1914年)、数度にわたる経済競争期(第一次世界大戦前と1920年代)、1939年の「独ソ不可侵条約」といった両国の良好な関係を阻害するような要因も多々存在したことにも言及し、現代史における日独関係史の再説を試みました。理解の一助になれば幸いです。

東洋研究所の理念・目的

東洋研究所の起源は1921年の貴・衆両院による「漢学振興二関スル建議案」の決議に由来する。この背景にある基本的理念は、①漢学を中心とする東洋学術の研究、②東西文化の融合による新しい文化の創造をめざすことにあった。この理念実現の推進母体として1923年大東文化協会が創設され、研究組織として、①漢学を中心とする東洋学術の研究部門として東洋研究部を、②東西文化の融合による新しい文化の創造をめざす比較研究部を設け、教育機関として大東文化学院を設立した。この二つの研究部は1953年学校法人大東文化大学付属大東文化研究所に継承され、1961年学校法人大東文化学園の振興計画の一環として、新たに「東洋研究所」として過去の①・②の理念を継承している。

東洋研究所の目的は、学則第6条に基づく大東文化大学東洋研究所規定によって定められ、「アジアを中心とする人文・社会・自然の科学的調査研究を行い、広く学術の発達に寄与すること。」とされている。当初研究局第一部人文科学系と第二部社会科学系の2組織がおかれ、その後専任研究員の就任に伴い人文科学班、政治・経済班、国際関係班の3班に分かれての研究活動に入った。時代の要請に従い個人研究はもとより、学際的・総合的共同研究の重要性を強調し、学際的メンバーによる研究部会を設け、研究成果を学術雑誌「東洋研究」に掲載するとともに、刊行物を発行し世に成果を問うている。また、研究成果を地域社会への還元として公開講座を開催し、国際交流の一環として、外国人講師による講演会等学術の発達に寄与することを目的に活動している。

(2014年7月)